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LGBT Families, Tax Nothings
Anthony C. Infanti1
I.

Introduction

According to the proverb, “the eyes are the windows of the soul.”2 One
might say that, like the eyes, the law—particularly an area of public law such
as tax law—is a window on our collective American soul. The tax law
provides a view of both who we are as a society and what we aspire to be.3
Less proverbially (and more accurately), one might say that the tax law
serves an expressive function by showcasing what the dominant group(s) in
American society purport to value and how they value it.4 In this regard, the
tax law provides insights regarding the value, if any, that the dominant
group(s) in American society place on our many lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) families.5 To get a sense of these insights, this essay will
peer into the window created by federal tax law.

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. Thanks to the staff at the Journal of Gender, Race
& Justice for all of their hard work in putting together a well organized
conference and to the participants for an intellectually stimulating time
together.
2 THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 611 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
3 See Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251,
319–20 & n.354 (2003) (discussing the view held, to differing degrees, by
many comparativists and legal historians that law is a mirror of society);
David Nelken, Legal Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors,
in COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19, 20–29 (Andrew Harding &
Esin Örücü eds., 2002) (discussing the controversy among comparativists,
legal historians, and sociologists regarding the relationship between law and
society); see generally Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of
Transplants and Receptions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
441 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); David Nelken,
Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A
HANDBOOK 109 (Esin Örücü & David Nelken eds., 2007).
4 Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1243–49 (2008)
(summarizing the Gramscian concept of “hegemony”).
5 According to the 2010 American Community Survey, there were
approximately 594,000 same-sex households in the United States in that year.
Daphne Lofquist, Same-Sex Couple Households: American Community
Survey
Briefs,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
1
(Sept.
2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-03.pdf. Of these, 115,000
1
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Before providing the obligatory roadmap of this essay’s discussion of
what can be seen through this window, a few words about this essay’s scope
are in order. Elsewhere, I have argued at length for making the federal
income tax relationship neutral by allowing individuals to choose their own
families for tax purposes—rather than forcing them to fit within preconceived
notions of what a family ought to look like, as we do now.6 This essay does not
directly repeat that call for reform, but it does help to fill in the background
against which that call was made. Though there are many different forms of
LGBT families (as there are of so-called traditional families), this essay
focuses on the differential tax treatment of one subset of LGBT families;
namely, those composed of a same-sex couple with children, where one spouse
stays at home to care for the other spouse and their children. These families,
despite their close resemblance to the prototypical nuclear family, are placed
at a distinct disadvantage as compared with their traditional counterparts.
Other families that depart from the traditional model of the nuclear family—
whether gay or straight—are also valued less for tax purposes; however,
fuller treatment of their legal predicament is beyond the scope of this essay.
With a better understanding of the scope of the instant endeavor, I will
now set forth the roadmap of the discussion. In Part II, we will look through
the window created by the federal tax law to observe which families it sees
and values. Unsurprisingly, we will find that the federal tax law sees one
basic type of family: the traditional family constructed around a different-sex
married couple and their children. Although the federal tax law takes
households (or nearly 20%) “reported having children.” Id. at 2. (For a
discussion of the problems with the data regarding same-sex couples
compiled as part of the 2010 Census, see generally Martin O’Connell & Sarah
Feliz, Same-sex Couple Household Statistics from the 2010 Census (Soc., Econ.
& Hous. Statistics Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working Paper No. 201126, 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssreport.doc.) More recently, the Williams Institute released a report analyzing
trends in data from the American Community Survey between 2005 and 2011.
Gary J. Gates, Same-sex and Different-sex Couples in the American
Community
Survey:
2005–2011,
WILLIAMS
INST.
(Feb.
2013),
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/census-lgbt-demographicsstudies/ss-and-ds-couples-in-acs-2005-2011/. This report also indicates that,
in 2011, nearly 20% of same-sex couples were raising children under the age
of eighteen. Id. at 5.
Naturally, these numbers reflect only one form of LGBT family,
namely, one patterned after the traditional family by being constructed
around a conjugal couple.
6 See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive
Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
605.
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account of recognized variants of the traditional family (e.g., a widow/er with
children, single parents, and children caring for aged parents or young
siblings), the more closely a family conforms to the model of the prototypical
traditional family, the more the federal tax law values it. Despite being
closely patterned after the traditional family form, LGBT families headed by
same-sex couples are left in the federal tax law’s blind spots and thus go
partly or wholly unseen. Like many wholly owned business entities, LGBT
families are thus treated as tax “nothings”; that is, they are disregarded for
federal tax purposes.7
In Part III, we will explore how these LGBT families can, like
disregarded business entities, sometimes make themselves visible for federal
tax purposes.8 Unlike disregarded entities, however, LGBT families headed
by same-sex couples must “misrepresent and ‘carve up’ their families” 9 in
order to mimic family arrangements that are seen by the federal tax laws—
all in order to obtain a fraction of the tax benefits afforded to traditional
families. It is deeply troubling to ask same-sex couples to deny lived reality
by misrepresenting themselves and the composition of their families on a
form signed under penalty of perjury.10 Yet, the focus of this essay is not on
the tax disadvantages that these LGBT families experience because of the
need either to rearrange their families on a single return or to split their
E.g., David S. Miller, The Tax Nothing, 74 TAX NOTES 619 (1997).
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(iv)(B) (as amended in 2012) (treating
disregarded entities as entities separate from their owners for employment
tax purposes); Notice 99-6, 1999-1 C.B. 321 (indicating that some taxpayers
urged the Internal Revenue Service to treat disregarded entities as separate
entities for employment tax purposes, notwithstanding that this was contrary
to Treasury Regulations then in effect); T.D. 9356, 2007-2 C.B. 675 (siding
with those who urged separate treatment and promulgating the regulation
cited at the beginning of this footnote on the ground that it would ease
administration of the tax laws by the Internal Revenue Service and
compliance by taxpayers).
9 MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., UNEQUAL TAXATION AND UNDUE
BURDENS
FOR
LGBT
FAMILIES
5
(2012),
available
at
http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/unequal-taxation-undue-burdens-for-lgbtfamilies.pdf.
10 See id. at 9 (discussing how LGBT families must split themselves up in
order to be seen by the tax laws); Tax Considerations for Same-Sex Couples,
LAMBDA LEGAL (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/taxconsiderations (discussing the conundrum faced by married same-sex couples
who must claim “single” filing status on their federal income tax returns, and
providing them with a document that they can attach to their returns
explaining that they are actually married but are filing “single” because of
the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
7
8
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families up among different tax returns; those disadvantages are well
known.11 Instead, the focus here is on the specific manner in which these
LGBT families are encouraged to rearrange or carve themselves up in order
to be seen and obtain federal tax benefits.
The contribution of this essay to the symposium Modern Families:
Changing Families, Challenging Laws is to explore the rhetorical and
psychological price that LGBT families must pay in order to be seen by the
federal tax laws. To obtain maximum tax advantages, LGBT families with a
stay-at-home spouse must reorder themselves so that one spouse is the
“taxpayer” who files a return claiming the other spouse and the couple’s
children as “dependents.”12 In Part IV, this essay discusses how, in a society
that prizes autonomy and self-reliance,13 this reordering requires same-sex
couples to participate in their own stigmatization merely to gain access to a
fraction of the tax benefits afforded to traditional families. Although a case
currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court appears to hold the promise
of ending the need for this self-stigmatization,14 Part V explains why this
promise may not turn out to be a reality. Part VI contains brief concluding
remarks.
II.

Tax Families

The federal income, gift, and estate tax laws see only one type of
family: the traditional family. Through different lenses, the tax laws see the
traditional family either at its core (i.e., the married different-sex couple), as
the nuclear family (i.e., the core plus children), or as the extended family (i.e.,
the nuclear family plus other blood or adoptive/adopted relatives, at varying
degrees of inclusivity). For all of the different permutations of the traditional
See generally MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 9.
Claiming an Unmarried Partner as a Dependent on Your Tax Return,
NOLO
(last
visited
Mar.
27,
2013),
www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/claiming-unmarried-partner-dependent-tax-29735.html; Alden
Wicker, Your Taxes: If You’re a Same-Sex Married Couple…, LEARNVE$T
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.learnvest.com/knowledge-center/your-taxes-ifyoure-a-same-sex-married-couple/; see Richard M. Horwood et al., Estate
Planning for the Unmarried Adult, Tax Mgm’t Portfolio (BNA) No. 813, §
III(C)(1)(a) (2013) (discussing how one domestic partner can qualify as the
“dependent” of the other); Jeffrey A. Zaluda, A “Spouse” by Any Other Name
Is Not Necessarily a “Spouse,” 34 TAX MGM’T EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 178 (2009)
(same).
13 See generally MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY (2005).
14 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2012
U.S. LEXIS 9413 (Dec. 7, 2012).
11
12
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family that it sees, the federal tax laws turn a blind eye to LGBT families—
especially those that are most closely patterned after the prototypical
traditional family. In this Part, I provide a brief survey of the different ways
that the federal tax laws see the traditional family before addressing their
failure to see LGBT families.
A.

Seeing the “Core”15

For federal income tax purposes, the only collective, personal16 taxable
unit is the married different-sex couple.17 All other individual taxpayers file
15

[P]rivacy has not been awarded to just any group considering
itself a family. The contour of the family entitled to protection
through privacy has historically been defined as the
reproductive unit of husband and wife, giving primacy to the
marital tie. It was anticipated that this basic pairing would
eventually be complemented by the addition of children. …
Extended-family members, such as elderly parents or unmarried
siblings, may also have been incorporated into the family once
its basic tie was forged. The legitimate family—the one entitled
to privacy protection—however, was defined in the first instance
through marriage.
FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 110.
16 As opposed to business. For example, partnerships and corporations can be
tax(able) units. I.R.C. §§ 11 (imposing tax on corporations), 702(b)
(determining the character of partnership items at the partnership level), 703
(requiring taxable income to be computed at the partnership level and
requiring many elections to be made at the partnership level), 6031
(requiring partnerships to file tax returns), 6221–6234 (auditing partnership
items at the partnership level), 7704 (treating publicly traded partnerships
as corporations for federal tax purposes) (LEXIS through Jan. 15, 2013).
17 Id. § 6013. For this purpose, the Internal Revenue Service has indicated
that a different-sex couple that has entered into a civil union or domestic
partnership that is legally equivalent to marriage may also file jointly. Amy S.
Elliott, IRS Memo Indicates Civil Unions Are Marriages for Tax Purposes,
133 TAX NOTES 794 (2011). For the sake of simplicity, in this essay all
different-sex couples who are treated as “married” for federal tax purposes
will be referred to as “married different-sex couples” regardless of the label
applied to their relationship.
The filing of a joint return is elective; however, the vast majority of
married different-sex couples choose to file jointly. See I.R.S. Pub. No. 1304,
Individual Income Tax Returns 2010, at 39–40 tbl.1.2 (2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10inalcr.pdf (indicating that, for taxable year
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their own, separate income tax returns. The federal gift and estate taxes do
not permit the filing of joint returns by any taxpayer.18 Nonetheless, both
treat the married different-sex couple as a unit by refraining from taxing
transfers of property until the property leaves the marital unit.19 In addition,
for gift tax purposes, married different-sex couples are permitted to split
their gifts to third parties between them.20 A report from the Committee on
Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives articulates the policy
underlying this treatment, stating that, “[i]n general, it is inappropriate to
tax transfers between spouses. This policy … reflects the fact that a husband
and wife are a single economic unit.”21 This policy is so deeply entrenched
that the federal income, gift, and estate taxes all continue to see the married
different-sex couple as a unit even after the marriage has ended due to
divorce.22
Even though the tax laws see all married different-sex couples, they
value certain of these couples more than others. For couples who adhere to
the model of the working husband and stay-at-home wife, the federal income
2010, the number of married filing jointly returns was 53,526,090 while the
number of married filing separately returns was 2,532,292). As of this writing,
all same-sex couples (whether married or in an equivalent relationship) are
prohibited from filing a joint federal income tax return, whether they wish to
or not. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (LEXIS through Jan. 15, 2013). For a discussion of the
possibility that this provision may be struck down on constitutional grounds,
see infra Part V.
18 I.R.C. §§ 6018, 6019.
19 Id. §§ 2056, 2523 (permitting the tax-free transfer of property between
different-sex spouses). The income tax similarly permits the tax-free transfer
of property between different-sex spouses—and, in some cases, former
different-sex spouses—regardless of whether the couple files their tax return
together or separately (indeed, once divorced a formerly married different-sex
couple ceases to be eligible to file a joint federal income tax return). Id. §
1041; Treas. Reg. § 1.6013-4(a) (as amended in 2002) (flush language).
20 I.R.C. § 2513 (permitting married different-sex spouses to split gifts).
21 H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1491 (1984) (emphasis added).
22 I.R.C. §§ 71, 215 (dealing with the taxation of alimony payments and
together continuing the income-splitting privilege associated with the joint
federal income tax return after divorce); 1041(a)(2) (no recognition of gain or
loss on the transfer of property to a former spouse incident to divorce); 2516
(likewise exempting property settlements incident to divorce from gift tax);
2043(b)(2) (importing the rules of § 2516 into the estate tax); see Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1041-1T, Q&A (6) (as amended in 2003) (flush language) (“a transfer
of property occurring not more than one year after the date on which the
marriage ceases need not be related to the cessation of the marriage to
qualify for section 1041 treatment”).
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tax rewards them with a “marriage bonus.” In other words, the husband will
pay less tax on his income than if he had remained single because the federal
tax laws allow him to split his income with his wife (for tax purposes only—
actual sharing is not required).23 In contrast, the federal income tax imposes
a “marriage penalty” on those couples who depart from this model by having
both spouses out in the work force earning relatively equal amounts.
Splitting income does not help these dual-earner couples, and the husband
and wife often end up paying more tax than if they had remained single.24 In
this way, the federal income tax not only sees different-sex married couples,
but also actively encourages one type of marital arrangement over all others
(i.e., the working husband with a stay-at-home wife).
B.

Seeing the Nuclear Family

The federal tax laws also see the children of different-sex married
couples as an inextricable part of the family unit. For example, to prevent
abuse, the federal income tax will, under some circumstances, aggregate the
income of children with that of their parents. The purpose of this “kiddie” tax
is to prevent parents from dividing their investment income among their
minor children in order to lower their own tax bills by obtaining access to the
lower rate brackets multiple times (i.e., as many times as the number of
children that they have).25 The kiddie tax combats this abuse by either taxing
the child’s investment income at the parent’s marginal tax rate or by having
the parents report the child’s investment income on their own tax return.26 In
either case, this provision creates a quasi-collective taxable unit that can
include the entire nuclear family.27
At the same time, the federal income tax provides numerous tax
benefits to the nuclear family, including additional personal exemptions for
dependent children, the child tax credit, the dependent care assistance credit,
an exclusion for employer-provided dependent care assistance programs, an
expanded earned income credit for families with children, a credit for

BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 111.3.2(1), available at 1997 WL 440072.
24 Id.
25 I.R.C. § 1(g); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 23, ¶ 111.3.8, available at
1997 WL 440072.
26 I.R.C. § 1(g)(1), (3), (4), (7).
27 Cf. id. § 1(g)(5) (providing rules for determining the taxation of the child’s
investment income if the child’s parents are unmarried or file separate
returns).
23
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adoption expenses, and tax benefits for educational expenses.28 Furthermore,
the federal income tax allows employers to provide a number of tax-free
fringe benefits to the spouses and dependents of their employees. Chief
among these benefits is tax-free health insurance coverage. 29 In addition,
employers can provide to employees, their spouses (including widows and
widowers), and their dependent children the following benefits free of income
tax: (1) no-additional-cost services (e.g., an airline can provide standby flights
on its planes), (2) qualified employee discounts (e.g., a clothing retailer can
provide clothing at a discount), and (3) use of on-premises athletic facilities.30
(And, foreshadowing the discussion in the next section of this Part, the
federal income tax allows airlines to provide standby flights to their
employees’ parents free of income tax as well.31) Naturally, this listing of taxfree fringe benefits is not exhaustive.32

Id. §§ 21, 23, 24, 32, 129, 151. For a discussion of how LGBT families often
experience these provisions differently (or benefit from them not at all), see
generally MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 9.
The credit for adoption expenses is one example of a provision where
nontraditional (i.e., legally unseen) families have an advantage over
traditional families. Normally, expenses incurred in connection with
stepparent adoptions are ineligible for this credit. I.R.C. § 23(d)(1)(C). But
because the federal tax laws do not see LGBT families, one same-sex spouse’s
adoption of the other’s children through a second-parent adoption should
escape this prohibition because of the lack of a federally recognized spousal
relationship. To the contrary, gay couples who use a surrogate to aid them in
family formation will find that they are completely denied this credit. Id.
§ 23(d)(1)(B). Infertile married different-sex couples are likewise denied the
adoption credit; however, that denial is premised on the assumption that
these couples will be able to deduct surrogacy-related expenses as medical
expenses. Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility
Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1159–60 (2004).
29 I.R.C. §§ 105, 106; see Treas. Reg. §§ 1.106-1 (1960) (indicating that
spouses and dependents are also covered by the § 106 exclusion); Notice 200479, 2004-49 I.R.B. 898 (indicating that the Internal Revenue Service intends
to conform the definition of dependent in Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 with that in
§ 105(b) and permitting taxpayers to rely on the notice pending the issuance
of those regulations).
30 I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (2), (h)(1), (2), (j)(4); see Treas. Reg. § 1.132-1(b)(1), (3) (as
amended in 1993) (explaining inclusion of family members in coverage of this
exclusion for certain fringe benefits), -2 (1989) (explaining no-additional-cost
services), -3 (1989) (explaining qualified employee discounts).
31 I.R.C. § 132(h)(3).
32 See, e.g., id. §§ 117(d), 119, 132(g).
28
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The federal income tax also continues to see the entire nuclear family
in other ways after one of the different-sex spouses passes away. For example,
a surviving spouse with a dependent child will still use the rate schedule for
married taxpayers filing jointly during the two taxable years following the
year in which the decedent spouse passed away.33 During the same two-year
period, a surviving spouse likewise receives the same standard deduction as a
married couple filing jointly, the same exclusion for gain on the sale of a
principal residence, and the same increased threshold for the application of
the overall limitation on itemized deductions.34
Following this two-year period, a surviving spouse with dependent
children will normally qualify for head of household status. 35 The rate
schedule for heads of household was enacted in 1951 to recognize that
unmarried persons with dependents—particularly widows and widowers—
have family responsibilities similar to those of married different-sex
couples. 36 Although less beneficial than the married filing jointly rate
schedule, the head of household rate schedule was originally designed to
“produce[] a tax liability for a given amount that was midway between the
liability of a single person and that of a married couple filing a joint return.”37
Head of household status continues to provide significantly better rates than
those afforded to “single” taxpayers. Just to pick a random example from the
2012 tax tables, a taxpayer with $50,000 of taxable income who files as single
owes $8,536 of tax while a taxpayer with the same taxable income who files
as head of household owes $7,151 of tax, for a reduction in the tax due of
more than 16%.38 Even this example may understate the benefit because
head of household status also comes with a larger standard deduction,
meaning that the difference in tax rate is likely even larger than it seems.39
The more advantageous rate schedule and standard deduction are not limited
Id. §§ 1(a)(2), 2(a).
Id. §§ 63(c)(2)(A)(ii), 68(b)(1)(A), 121(b)(4).
35 Id. § 2(b).
36 S. REP. NO. 82-871, at 10 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1978–79 (“The hardship appears particularly severe in the case of the
individual with children to raise who, upon the death of his spouse, finds
himself in the position not only of being denied the spouse’s aid in raising the
children, but under present law also may find his tax load much heavier.”);
H.R. REP. NO. 82-586, at 11 (1951), reprinted in 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1781,
1790–91 (same); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1417–18 (1975); Patricia A. Cain, Dependency, Taxes, and
Alternative Families, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 273–74 (2002).
37 Bittker, supra note 36, at 1417.
38 I.R.S. Instructions for 2012 Form 1040, at 85 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf.
39 I.R.C. § 63(c)(2). For an illustration, see infra Tables 1–3.
33
34
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to surviving spouses or formerly married persons; however, as we will see in
Part III, it fails to apply to many LGBT families.
C.

Seeing the Extended Family

Expanding the traditional family beyond its nuclear core, the federal
income tax laws often recognize that other relatives (e.g., brothers and sisters,
parents, grandparents, and grandchildren),40 even though not constituting an
economic unit, will act together to advance each other’s interests for tax
purposes in ways that unrelated persons would not. For example, family
members might sell each other assets in order to recognize losses and reduce
taxes without losing control of the assets. 41 Or they might acquire each
other’s debts at a discount (and become each other’s creditors) to avoid the
recognition of discharge of indebtedness income.42 Or they might engage in
like-kind exchanges of property to defer the taxation of gain on property that
they wish to sell (and, in some cases, to simultaneously accelerate the
recognition of loss on the other property involved in the exchange).43
The federal estate and gift tax laws likewise recognize that taxpayers
will often aggressively attempt to reduce their transfer tax burden in order to
maximize the amount of wealth transferred to their relatives. For example,
there are special valuation rules that disregard attempts at “freezing” the
transfer tax value of an interest in a corporation or partnership. Such
“freezes” occur when a taxpayer transfers an interest (e.g., common stock) by
gift to a family member while retaining an interest (e.g., preferred stock)
whose value is exaggerated simply to reduce the amount of the taxable
portion of the transfer—the same portion of the transfer that is later
insulated from estate tax upon the eventual death of the taxpayer (hence, the
notion of a “freeze”). 44 The federal estate tax also aggregates family
ownership of a corporation (borrowing rules from the income tax) for
purposes of determining whether the retention of voting rights upon the
transfer of stock is tantamount to the retention of the enjoyment of the
property, triggering the property’s inclusion in the transferor’s gross estate.45
I.R.C. §§ 267(c)(4), 318(a)(1).
Id. § 267(a).
42 Id. § 108(e)(4).
43 Id. § 1031(f).
44 Id. § 2701; see also id. §§ 2702–2704 (applying to transfers in trust, buy-sell
agreements, and the lapse of voting or liquidation rights involving family
members).
45 Id. § 2036(a)(1), (b). As applied by the Internal Revenue Service, § 2036,
again borrowing rules from the income tax, also takes family relationships
into account in determining whether a power to remove and replace a trustee
will be deemed “a reservation of the trustee’s discretionary powers of
40
41
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In other situations, Congress singles out the extended traditional
family for tax benefits. For example, for federal estate tax purposes, certain
property used in a farming or other business qualifies for advantageous
valuation rules—but only if the property passes to a member of the
decedent’s extended family (i.e., the taxpayer’s spouse, the taxpayer’s
ancestors, the taxpayer’s lineal descendants (and their spouses), the lineal
descendants of the taxpayer’s spouse (and their spouses), or the lineal
descendants (and spouses) of the taxpayer’s parents). 46 Congress has also
been concerned with ensuring that tax benefits are afforded to taxpayers
even if they diffuse ownership of property within their families. For example,
for federal income tax purposes, the 100-shareholder limit that applies to
small business corporations wishing to be taxed on a pass-through basis (i.e.,
only at the shareholder level, rather than at both the corporate and
shareholder levels) treats all members of a family—six generations worth, to
boot—as a single shareholder.47
III.

Tax “Dependents”

As the discussion in Part II suggests, many tax provisions do expand
the range of families who are seen to include less traditional family forms.
For instance, single parent families, a child caring for elderly parents, an
adult sibling caring for minor siblings, and others are accounted for through
provisions that see a taxpayer and her “dependents.” Most provisions that see
these other family forms afford taxpayers beneficial deductions, credits, and
exclusions from gross income.48 Less often, these provisions deny benefits to
taxpayers unless a payment is made to someone who is not a dependent (i.e.,
someone who is not a recognized member of the taxpayer’s family), typically
to prevent abuse.49
As we will explore in this Part, LGBT families—particularly, those
composed of a same-sex couple with children—do not easily fall within the
ambit of even this expanded vision of the family. Nonetheless, LGBT families
distribution over the property transferred by the decedent-grantor to the
trust.” Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191. For a discussion of both of these
provisions and how they define family, see Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits
and Penalties of Kinship: Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law,
3 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 7–15, 28–29, 30–32 (2005).
46 I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2). For a discussion of this rules, see Crawford, supra
note 45, at 16–23.
47 I.R.C. § 1361(c)(1).
48 For a catalog of these provisions, see Anthony C. Infanti, Inequitable
Administration: Documenting Family for Tax Purposes, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 329, 354–64, 367–70 (2011).
49 Id. at 365–70.
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are often advised to realign their families in ways that allow one member of
the family to claim other family members as dependents. Through such
realignment, part (or sometimes all) of an LGBT family can make itself
visible for tax purposes and become eligible for some (though not all) of the
tax benefits afforded to traditional families.50
Although it is not entirely confined to traditional family relationships,
the federal income tax definition of a “dependent” is permeated by the idea of
the traditional family. For federal income tax purposes, two categories of
individuals can qualify as “dependents”: a taxpayer’s “qualifying child” or a
taxpayer’s “qualifying relative.” 51 In the following paragraphs, I provide a
brief description of each of these categories of dependents.
A.

Qualifying Child

A “qualifying child” includes a taxpayer’s son, daughter, stepson,
stepdaughter, adopted son, adopted daughter, or foster child, as well as any
of their descendants.52 A qualifying child also includes the taxpayer’s brother,
sister, stepbrother, stepsister, half-brother, half-sister, adopted brother, or
adopted sister, as well as any of their descendants.53 In addition to having the
correct type of familial relationship with the taxpayer, the qualifying child
must (1) share the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more
than one-half of the taxable year; (2) be younger than the taxpayer; (3) be
under the age of nineteen (or, if a student, under the age of twenty-four),
unless permanently and totally disabled; (4) not have provided more than
one-half of his/her own support during the year; and (5) not have filed a joint
return with his/her spouse. 54 Other parent–child (or quasi-parent–child)
relationships simply are not recognized for this purpose.55
In many states, LGBT families with children may be surprised to learn
that their children are not “qualifying children” of both parents due to the
absence of a legally recognized relationship between the children and one of
the parents. Take, for example, Helen and Mary, a hypothetical lesbian
couple with children biologically related to Mary. The couple, who
periodically throughout this essay will help to illustrate the concrete impact
of tax provisions affecting LGBT families, live in a state where their
See supra note 12.
I.R.C. § 152(a).
52 Id. § 152(c)(2)(A) & (f)(1).
53 Id. § 152(c)(2)(B) & (f)(1), (4).
54 Id. § 152(c)(1)(B)–(E).
55 See Begay v. Comm’r, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114 (2013) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to the definition of “qualifying child” brought by a
Navajo elder with clan-based obligations to a child who did not fit squarely
within the relationship requirements of § 152(c)).
50
51
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relationship is not legally recognized and second-parent adoption is not
permitted. Consequently, Helen has been left without any legal ties to the
couple’s children. Helen and Mary may (or may not) be surprised to learn
that their children are only qualifying children of Mary and not of Helen.56
This is important because, notwithstanding the suspicion with which the
courts view classifications based on a child’s legitimacy,57 some federal tax
provisions cover only qualifying children and not dependent children who are
merely “qualifying relatives” (if that).58 In this way, we once again observe
the federal tax laws favoring certain types of families—those that hew most
closely to the traditional family model—over all others.
Among the important tax benefits that are affected by this distinction
between “qualifying” and “other” children are the child credit, the earned
income credit, the dependent care assistance credit, and the exclusion from
See Smith v. Comm’r, No. 10405-07, T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-125 (Sept. 18,
2008) (holding that a taxpayer who had married in a religious ceremony but
who had not obtained a marriage license in a state that does not recognize
common law marriage could not claim an additional personal exemption or
the child tax credit with respect to her spouse’s children because they were
his qualifying children and not her own); Cain, supra note 36, at 268 (“Nontraditional families include unmarried heterosexual parents, sometimes
living together, as well as same sex partners who co-parent children that are
sometimes legally recognized as the children of both parents. In all of these
non-traditional families, the children are classified as nonmarital—
historically known as illegitimate or bastard.”); Patricia A. Cain, Federal Tax
Consequences of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (2002)
(indicating that the federal tax laws rely upon state law for making
determinations of marital and family status); Parenting Laws: Second Parent
Adoption,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN
(Dec.
14,
2012),
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/parenting_laws_2nd.pdf (indicating
that only eighteen states and the District of Columbia permit second-parent
adoptions statewide; notably, all but two of these states legally recognize
same-sex marriages or same-sex civil unions or domestic partnerships that
are the legal equivalent of a marriage, see Marriage Equality and Other
Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/Relationship_Recognition_Laws_Ma
p.pdf).
57 Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Gay and Lesbian
Parents: Challenging the Three Pillars of Exclusion—Legitimacy, DualGender Parenting, and Biology, 28 LAW & INEQ. 307, 322–25 (2010);
Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends: Same-Sex Marriage
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
2373, 2379–85 (2007).
58 See infra text accompanying note 75.
56
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gross income for employer-provided dependent care assistance—all of which
turn on whether a taxpayer has one or more qualifying children. 59 For
instance, in Leonard v. Commissioner, 60 a taxpayer supported a disabled
“friend” of the same sex (who had lived with her for more than a decade) and
the friend’s grandchildren. The grandchildren qualified as the taxpayer’s
dependents because they met the definition of a “qualifying relative”
(described below). 61 Nonetheless, the taxpayer was ineligible to claim the
dependent care assistance credit, the child credit, and the earned income
credit—all because the grandchildren were not her “qualifying children,” as
defined above.62 Returning to our example, if Mary remains in the home to
care for the children and has no income, the ability to claim the dependent
care assistance credit, to participate in an employer-provided dependent care
assistance program, to claim the child tax credit, and to claim (in whole or in
part) the earned income credit will simply be lost. For purposes of these
provisions, the federal tax laws turn this intact LGBT family into a tax
nothing—it is as if this family did not exist at all.
If Mary and Helen live in a state that either (1) recognizes their
relationship with each other and with their children (e.g., through a
presumption of parenthood) or (2) refuses to recognize their relationship but
allows both parents to establish a legal relationship with the children (e.g.,
through second-parent adoption), then the children should be qualifying

I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 32, 129; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2008-12-024 (Mar. 21,
2008); see Treas. Reg. § 1.21-1(b)(1)(i) (2007) (explaining the reference to
§ 152(a)(1) in § 21(b)(1)(A) as referring specifically to the definition of
“qualifying child”); see generally MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 6–7. The dependent care assistance credit is nonrefundable
(meaning that someone with no income tax liability will have no use for the
credit) and employer-provided dependent care assistance programs
necessarily apply only to those who are employed. I.R.C. § 26. In addition, a
taxpayer must have earned income to claim the refundable portion of the
child tax credit and to claim the earned income credit at all. Id. §§ 24(d),
32(a), (c)(2).
Certain individuals without qualifying children can claim the earned
income credit; however, the credit for these individuals is much smaller and
is phased out at very low levels of income. I.R.C. § 32(b), (c)(1)(A)(ii). For
example, in 2012, taxpayers without a qualifying child became ineligible for
the earned income credit when their adjusted gross income reached $13,980
(or $19,190 for married different-sex couples filing a joint return). I.R.S.
Instructions for 2012 Form 1040, supra note 38, at 49.
60 No. 12719-07S, 2008 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 141 (Nov. 4, 2008).
61 Id. at *6–9.
62 Id. at *10–13.
59
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children of both women.63 Nevertheless, only one of them will be able to claim
the children as dependents.64 Given that this is an intact LGBT family, Helen
will claim the children as dependents because she has the higher adjusted
gross income. 65 Moreover, because the children are Helen’s qualifying
children, she will be able to file using head of household status. 66 In this
situation, even though Helen and Mary’s state sees an intact family, the
federal tax laws would refuse to see this reality and instead would insist that
they reconfigure their family. Precisely how their family would be
reconfigured will have to await the discussion in Part IV, regarding whether
the federal tax laws will see any connection at all between Helen and Mary or
will instead treat them as legal strangers.
B.

Qualifying Relative
1.

The Rules

See Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Same-Sex Couples,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
at
Q&A-8
(Aug.
4,
2012),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-SameSex-Couples (indicating that the Internal Revenue Service will treat a
member of a same-sex couple as a stepparent of a child if that individual is
treated as a stepparent of the child under state law).
64 Id. at Q&A-3.
Certain provisions allow a child to be treated as the dependent of both
parents. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 132(h)(2)(B), 213(d)(5); see id. § 152(f)(7). However,
these provisions apply only to children who fall within the special rule in
§ 152(e) for children of divorced or separated parents. Id. § 152(e)(1)(A). For
an intact LGBT family such as Helen and Mary’s, these provisions are of no
help because their children will not fall within § 152(e).
65 I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B). If Helen and Mary live in a community property state
that legally recognizes their relationship, then the federal tax laws will
respect the application of the state’s community property laws and each of
them will report one-half of the total community income. I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Advice 2010-21-050 (May 5, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010-21-048 (May 5,
2010). If neither has a higher adjusted gross income because all of their
income is community income, then it appears that either (but not both) of
them can claim the child as a dependent. Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions for Same-Sex Couples, supra note 63, at Q&A-3. Though this
informal guidance appears to always afford same-sex couples the ability to
choose which of them will claim their children as dependents, this position
contravenes the plain language of § 152. See I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B), (e). The
application of community property laws might, however, adversely affect
Helen’s ability to claim head of household status. See infra note 66 and
accompanying text and note 81.
66 I.R.C. § 2(b).
63
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A “qualifying relative” includes most of the same relationships covered
under the definition of qualifying child.67 Other qualifying relatives include
the taxpayer’s father and mother, as well as their ancestors and their
brothers and sisters.68 The term further includes the taxpayer’s stepfather or
stepmother and the taxpayer’s in-laws (i.e., father-in-law, mother-in-law,
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law). 69 But all of
the foregoing categories of relatives will be qualifying relatives only if their
income is below the exemption amount ($3,800 in 2012) and if the taxpayer
provides more than half of their support.70
There is one final category of persons included within the group of
qualifying relatives, even though these persons bear no obvious (however
attenuated) family relationship to the taxpayer. The class of individuals
falling within this category is much broader than the others because it is not
confined to familial relationships recognized under the law; however, the
requirements that apply in order for this class of individuals to fall within the
definition of “qualifying relative” are stricter than those that apply to more
conventional familial relationships. This category includes any individual
(other than the taxpayer’s different-sex spouse) who meets the income and
support requirements mentioned above and who (1) has the same principal
place of abode as the taxpayer and (2) is a member of the taxpayer’s
household for the entire year.71 The taxpayer must both maintain and occupy
this household.72 A taxpayer is considered to maintain a household only if the
taxpayer furnishes over half the cost of maintaining the household.73

Compare id. § 152(c)(2) with id. § 152(d)(2)(A)–(B), (E). The definition of a
“qualifying relative” includes the son or daughter of a brother or sister, but,
unlike the definition of “qualifying child,” it does not include more distant
descendants. Id. § 152(d)(2)(E).
68 Id. § 152(d)(2)(C), (F).
69 Id. § 152(d)(2)(D), (G).
70 Id. § 152(d)(1)(B)–(C); Rev. Proc. 2011-52, § 3.19, 2011-2 C.B. 701.
71 I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(B)–(C), (2)(H). The prohibition against claiming spouses
as dependents applies without regard to the general convention of testing
marital status at the close of the taxable year. Id. § 152(d)(2)(H) (specifically
disregarding the rules of § 7703). Thus, if the individual is the taxpayer’s
spouse “at any time during the taxable year,” then the taxpayer cannot claim
the individual as a dependent. Id.
72 Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(b) (as amended in 1971).
73 I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (flush language); Rev. Rul. 64-41, 1964-1 C.B. 84; see
Leonard v. Comm’r, No. 12719–07S, 2008 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 141, at *7
(Nov. 4, 2008) (relying upon these authorities when interpreting
§ 152(d)(2)(H)).
67
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There is an exception to the definition of “qualifying relative” that is
designed to ensure that a child is claimed as the dependent of only one
taxpayer. Under this exception, a child who is one taxpayer’s qualifying child
is specifically prohibited from being another taxpayer’s qualifying relative.74
The Internal Revenue Service has, however, indicated that if the taxpayer
with respect to whom a child is a qualifying child is not required to—and does
not—file a federal income tax return, then another taxpayer may claim that
child as a qualifying relative.75
2.

The Repercussions

These rules compound the problems that many LGBT families
encounter when applying the definition of “qualifying child.” To return to our
hypothetical lesbian couple, we observed in the previous section that, absent
a legally recognized relationship, Mary and Helen’s children are not
qualifying children of Helen (and, therefore, cannot be claimed as her
dependents under that rubric). These children will be Helen’s qualifying
relatives (and, therefore, can be claimed as her dependents) only if: (1) they
have income below the exemption amount, (2) have the same principal place
of abode as Helen, (3) are members of Helen’s household for the entire
taxable year (and Helen must furnish over half the cost of maintaining that
household), and (4) receive more than half of their support from Helen.
Furthermore, for Helen to claim the children as her dependents, Mary must
earn so little income as not to be required to file a federal income tax return;
otherwise, the rule prohibiting the children from being claimed as dependents
by both Helen and Mary (because the children are Mary’s qualifying children)
would prohibit Helen from claiming the children as her dependents (and
effectively permit only Mary to claim them as dependents).
If this panoply of conditions is satisfied, then Helen will be able to
claim the children as her dependents. Yet, while this LGBT family will gain
some of the tax benefits afforded to traditional families, we must not lose
sight of the fact that this LGBT family will, in the process, lose the tax
benefits described in the previous section that are limited to taxpayers with
qualifying children (i.e., the child credit, the earned income credit, the
dependent care assistance credit, and the exclusion from gross income for
employer-provided dependent care assistance programs). Moreover, because
the children will qualify as Helen’s dependents only under the final, broad
I.R.C. § 152(d)(1)(D).
Notice 2008-5, 2008-1 C.B. 256 (indicating that the mere fact that the other
taxpayer files a return to obtain a refund of withheld income taxes will not
count as filing a return for this purpose, but claiming the earned income
credit on that return will void this exception); see Leonard, 2008 Tax Ct.
Summary LEXIS 141, at *9 (approving of this position).
74
75
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category for nonrelatives, Helen will be prohibited from using the more
generous head of household rate schedule and standard deduction and will
instead be relegated to the less generous rate schedule and standard
deduction for “single” taxpayers.76
In contrast, if Mary were to earn sufficient income to be required to file
a tax return but not be the family’s primary breadwinner, then the children
could be claimed as her dependents (and only her dependents).77 Accordingly,
the parent who provides the majority of the child’s support (i.e., Helen) would
be denied tax benefits that would normally accompany the ability to claim
the child as a dependent. This could result in erosion in the value of (or even
the loss of78) the various tax deductions and exclusions from gross income
that can be claimed with respect to dependents. The potential erosion in
value stems from the fact that the value of a deduction (as well as the value
of an exclusion from gross income, which is the equivalent of a deduction) is a
function of the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. The higher the taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate, the more value a deduction or exclusion holds for the
taxpayer. For example, a $100 deduction is worth $35 to a taxpayer with a
35% marginal tax rate but is only worth $15 to a taxpayer with a 15%
marginal tax rate. Allocating the deduction away from the higher-earning
spouse to the lower-earning spouse may thus result in a reduction in the
value of the tax benefit to the family. (To the contrary, if Mary’s earned
income is sufficiently low, then the fact that the couple’s relationship is not
legally recognized may permit her to—in the view of some, inappropriately—

I.R.C. § 2(b)(3)(B)(i); see supra text accompanying notes 37–38. For some
inexplicable reason, the Internal Revenue Service conceded in Leonard v.
Commissioner, 2008 Tax Ct. Summary LEXIS 141, at *1–2 n.2, that the
taxpayer was entitled to head of household status even though the
grandchildren in that case were the taxpayer’s dependents only by reason of
§ 152(d)(2)(H). Contra I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2008-12-024 (Mar. 21, 2008).
77 See Patricia A. Cain, Taxation of Domestic Partner Benefits: The Hidden
Costs, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 481, 495 (2010) (“because the partner’s child is the
qualifying child of the partner, the child will no longer qualify as any sort of
dependent for the taxpayer who is supporting that child”).
78 For example, if the payment of a deductible expense is made by Helen
rather than by Mary. Shifting income from Helen to Mary to pay these
expenses has its own tax consequences that may make this a far less than
attractive solution, even putting aside the possibility that the Internal
Revenue Service might try to recast this series of steps as a direct payment
by Helen of the expenses. For a discussion of the tax complexities faced by
same-sex couples who pool their income and assets, see generally Anthony C.
Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 763 (2004).
76
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claim the earned income credit where she and Helen would be ineligible to do
so based on their combined incomes.79)
It is little wonder then that LGBT rights and other progressive
organizations have expressed dismay at the ways in which these rules turn a
blind eye to intact LGBT families. In order to be seen at all, these families
must break themselves apart and distort their true composition—merely to
gain some of the benefits afforded to traditional (and, as we have seen, even
somewhat less traditional) families:
LGBT families must misrepresent and “carve up” their
families. Parents are forced to decide which parent “claims”
their children for exemptions. To gain tax relief, some families
must split their children between different tax returns. Other
LGBT parents can only claim their children as “qualifying
relatives” or cannot claim them at all. Heterosexual married
families can simply file jointly, account for all children on one
form, and check the exemption boxes.80
With the stage now set, we can turn in the next Part to determine what
connection (if any) the federal tax laws might see between Helen and Mary
themselves. As we will explore, if the federal tax laws do see a connection
between them, it will result in an even more pernicious reordering of their
LGBT family—one that not only requires misrepresentation and carving up
of the family but also exacts a dear psychological price by requiring the samesex couple to be active participants in their own stigmatization.
IV.

Dependency, Same-Sex Spouses, and Stigma

As described in the previous Part, the definition of “qualifying relative”
is purely geographical and financial; that is, it relates to places of abode,
households, amounts of income, and levels of financial support. It is entirely
untethered from marital and familial bonds. This creates an opportunity for
children who lack a legal relationship to one of their same-sex parents to be
claimed as a dependent by that parent. As we will explore in this Part, this
broad view of a “qualifying relative” likewise creates the possibility that one
same-sex spouse might be able to claim the other as a dependent.81 Where
Cain, supra note 36, at 284 n.114.
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 9, at 5.
81 The couple’s conjugal relationship will not prevent Helen from claiming
Mary as a dependent because, regardless of whether Mary and Helen’s
relationship is recognized for purposes of state law, they will not be
considered spouses for federal tax purposes. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (LEXIS through Jan.
15, 2013); cf. I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(H). There is a caveat here for same-sex
couples who live in community property states and who have entered into
79
80
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one same-sex spouse can claim all of the other members of the household (i.e.,
both her spouse and the couple’s children) as dependents, LGBT families are
not “carved up” for federal tax purposes, but instead are permitted to remain
“intact.” The question that we will explore now is the price that same-sex
couples must pay to have their families seen as an intact unit for federal
income tax purposes.
A.

Some Numbers (Just a Few!)

Returning to our hypothetical lesbian couple, if Mary works in the
home to care for Helen and the couple’s children, she will likely qualify as
Helen’s dependent. In other words, Mary would likely have income below the
exemption amount because she is not working outside the home, Helen would
provide more than half of Mary’s support, and, like the children, Mary would
have the same principal place of abode as Helen and be a member of Helen’s
household for the entire taxable year. 82 For Helen, this would open the
legally recognized relationships that bring them under the umbrella of the
state’s community property laws. See Questions and Answers for Registered
Domestic Partners and Same-Sex Spouses in Community Property States,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
at
Q&A-3
(Aug.
4,
2012),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Questions-and-Answers-for-Registered-DomesticPartners-and-Same-Sex-Spouses-in-Community-Property-States. In that
situation, the federal tax laws will respect the application of the community
property laws and each spouse will report one-half of the total community
income. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 2010-21-050 (May 5, 2010); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2010-21-048 (May 5, 2010). In effect, this may make it impossible for the
“dependent” same-sex spouse to meet the income and support tests for being
a qualifying relative because he/she will be attributed half of the earnings
and other community income of the same-sex spouse who is in the paid labor
market. Cf. Cain, supra note 77, at 496 (making a similar point with regard
to the ability of one same-sex spouse to claim the other as a dependent for
purposes of the federal income tax provisions dealing with employer-provided
health insurance). In many cases, it will also make it impossible for either of
the same-sex spouses to claim head of household status, because neither will
provide more than half the cost of maintaining the household. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)
(flush language); Questions and Answers for Registered Domestic Partners
and Same-Sex Spouses in Community Property States, supra, at Q&A-2.
82 For this purpose, an individual cannot be treated as a member of the
taxpayer’s household “if at any time during the taxable year of the taxpayer
the relationship between such individual and the taxpayer is in violation of
local law.” I.R.C. § 152(f)(3). Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), commentators expressed concern
about the ability of one same-sex spouse in a state with a sodomy law to
claim the other spouse as a dependent because of this exception. E.g., Adam
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possibility of claiming an additional personal exemption for Mary as well as
the many other tax benefits associated with dependents (though, again, not
head of household status unless Helen has a legal relationship with the
children that makes them her qualifying children).83 One important benefit of
being able to claim Mary as a dependent is that Helen will be able to add
Mary to her employer-provided health insurance (assuming that this option
is available to her at her place of employment) without the prohibitive tax
cost that would normally apply to this decision.84 Assuming that Helen would
also be able to claim the couple’s children as dependents, the entire family
would, in effect, appear on a single tax return, just as a nuclear family does
when a married different-sex couple files a joint federal income tax return.
Or would it? The federal tax laws see different families—or no families
at all—depending on the sexual orientation of the conjugal couple that is at
the family’s core. For instance, for an LGBT family with a stay-at-home
spouse where there is no legal relationship between the breadwinner and the
children, the tax return will include the entire family but be filed using
“single” status. In other words, the tax laws would see no family in the
traditional sense, just a single person supporting ostensible strangers. Where
there is a legal relationship between the breadwinner and the children, the
tax return will again include the entire LGBT family but be filed using “head
of household” status—as if there were no couple at the core of the family. A
similarly situated different-sex married couple would also file a tax return

Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 377
(1995). Following Lawrence, which struck down the remaining state sodomy
laws on constitutional grounds, this provision should no longer prevent one
same-sex spouse from claiming the other as a dependent.
83 See supra note 48.
84 Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity into
the Tax Classroom, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8–10 (2009); see Gates, supra note 5,
at 5 (indicating that different-sex couples are more likely to have both
spouses covered by health insurance and that “same-sex couples are twice as
likely as their different-sex counterparts to have only one spouse or partner
insured”).
It is worth noting that the income limitation in § 152(d)(1)(B) does not
apply in determining whether Mary is a dependent for purposes of the
provisions relating to employer-provided health insurance. See supra note 29.
However, same-sex couples in community property states may not qualify for
this benefit because the splitting of income between them under community
property law may prevent them from satisfying the support test (e.g., if all of
one spouse’s support is provided by the other out of community property
funds). Questions and Answers for Registered Domestic Partners and SameSex Spouses in Community Property States, supra note 81, at Q&A-4.
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that includes the entire family, but it would be filed using “married filing
jointly” status—recognizing both spouses and the children for what they are.
Tables 1 through 3 provide some very simple illustrations of the effect
on these families’ tax liabilities resulting from this difference in treatment.
The calculations in each table are based on the following set of assumptions:
Each family is composed of a conjugal couple (same-sex if filing as single or
head of household and different-sex if married filing jointly) with two
children (who are both qualifying children for the different-sex couple and for
the same-sex couple filing using head of household status, but are not
qualifying children of the taxpayer filing using single status). For the samesex couple, the spouse working in the paid labor force can (and does) claim
the stay-at-home spouse as a dependent. The different-sex couple is entitled
to two personal exemptions (i.e., one for each spouse). The couple has no
above-the-line-deductions or itemized deductions, the couple is filing for 2012
at the specified levels of gross income in the tables, and all income consists of
wages.
Table 1
Same-Sex Couple Filing as “Single”
Gross
Income

Standard
Deduction

Personal
Taxable
Exemptions Income

Tentative
Tax

Earned
Income
Credit

Tax
Due

$25,000

$5,950

$15,200

$3,850

$388

$0

$388

$50,000

$5,950

$15,200

$28,850

$3,896

$0

$3,896

$75,000

$5,950

$15,200

$53,850

$9,499

$0

$9,499

Table 2
Same-Sex Couple Filing as “Head of Household”
Gross
Income

Standard
Deduction

Personal
Taxable
Exemptions Income

Tentative
Tax

Earned
Income
Credit

Tax
Due

$25,000

$8,700

$15,200

$1,100

$111

$3,565

($3,454)

$50,000

$8,700

$15,200

$26,100

$3,299

$0

$3,299

$75,000

$8,700

$15,200

$51,100

$7,426

$0

$7,426
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Table 3
Different-Sex Couple Filing as “Married Filing Jointly”
Gross
Income

Standard
Deduction

Personal
Taxable
Exemptions Income

Tentative
Tax

Earned
Income
Credit

Tax
Due

$25,000

$11,900

$15,200

($2,100)

$0

$4,662

($4,662)

$50,000

$11,900

$15,200

$22,900

$2,569

$0

$2,569

$75,000

$11,900

$15,200

$47,900

$6,319

$0

$6,319

The differences here are stark and relate inversely to the level of legal
recognition afforded to the family. In each case, the LGBT family left wholly
unrecognized by the law (i.e., the family relegated to single filing status) is
taxed significantly more than the LGBT family that benefits from the legal
recognition of both parents (though not of the parents’ relationship with each
other) and much more than the different-sex couple. For the family with
$25,000 of gross income, which is very close to the poverty line,85 the samesex couple filing using single status actually owes a positive tax liability
where the family receiving some legal recognition and filing using head of
household status receives a refund of $3,454 due to the availability of the
earned income credit. The different-sex couple—with the same family
composition—fares even better, receiving a refund nearly 135% of that
received by the same-sex couple filing using head of household status.
A similar pattern can be seen at higher levels of income. At the
$50,000 gross income level, the same-sex couple filing their return using
single status owes the most in tax, or $3,896. The family filing their return
using head of household status owes approximately 15% less tax than the
family filing “single,” and the different-sex couple owes approximately 34%
less tax than the family filing “single.” At the $75,000 gross income level, the
same-sex couple filing their return using single status owes the most in tax,
or $9,499. The family filing their return using head of household status owes
approximately 12% less tax than the family filing “single,” and the differentsex couple owes nearly 34% less tax than the family filing “single.” Obviously,
how highly a family is valued for federal tax purposes relates both to the
sexual orientation of the couple that is at its core and, derivatively, to the
value placed on that family (in terms of legal recognition) by the state where
the family resides. Because they are treated as tax nothings, LGBT families
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4035
(Jan. 26, 2012).
85
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pay a clear and ascertainable price for departing from (i.e., directly
challenging) the traditional family norm.
B.

Differential Treatment Based on Sexual Orientation

As is assumed in the calculations above, when a husband and wife file
a joint federal income tax return, they are afforded two personal exemptions.
The second exemption is available to this different-sex couple not because the
stay-at-home spouse can be claimed as a “dependent” but because, in the
words of the Treasury Regulations, “there are two taxpayers (although under
section 6013 there is only one income for the two taxpayers on such return,
i.e., their aggregate income).” 86 If a husband and wife do not file a joint
return, then the husband may claim an additional personal exemption for the
wife only in the very limited circumstance where the wife does not file a
return, “has no gross income[,] and is not the dependent of another
taxpayer.”87 Indeed, the definition of a “dependent” is constructed so as to
prevent one different-sex spouse from ever claiming the other as a
dependent. 88 Nonetheless, through the addition of separate mention of
spouses, “[m]any, though not all, of the exclusions, deductions, and credits
that are provided (or denied) to a taxpayer with respect to her dependents
apply equally to the taxpayer’s different-sex spouse.”89
This is a key distinction between a tax return that purports to reflect
an intact LGBT family and one that reflects an intact traditional family.
Where one spouse is out in the paid labor force and the other works in the
home, the way that the family is viewed for federal tax purposes turns
entirely on the sexual orientation of the couple that is at the core of the
family. If the couple is same-sex, the federal tax laws see no couple at all.
Instead the federal tax laws see one individual who is the taxpayer earning
income out in the workforce and a series of individuals who are “dependent”
upon that taxpayer for their support (i.e., the stay-at-home spouse and the
couple’s children). In contrast, if the couple is different-sex, the federal tax
laws see the couple as two individuals working together to support and
Treas. Reg. § 1.151-1(b) (as amended in 1972) (emphasis added).
I.R.C. § 151(b).
88 See id. § 152(b)(2) (excepting from the definition of “dependent” an
individual who has filed a joint federal income tax return with his/her spouse),
(d)(2)(H) (specifically excepting spouses from the portion of the definition of
“qualifying relative” that does not turn on familial bonds between the
taxpayer and the dependent); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 23, ¶
30.3.1, .3.4[2], 1997 WL 439641 (providing examples of situations where one
different-sex spouse cannot claim the other as a dependent, even if they are
the other spouse’s sole support).
89 Infanti, supra note 48, at 372–73.
86
87
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maintain their family. As mentioned above, the Treasury Regulations
specifically acknowledge the existence of two separate taxpayers, even
though they are treated as an economic unit that reports a single combined
income. 90 The federal tax laws thus recognize the contributions of both
spouses to the family, seeing two taxpayers even if only one of the spouses is
earning income that is subject to tax. 91 This is important because calling
someone a “taxpayer” has been characterized as “emphasiz[ing] the
civic responsibility of taxpaying and confer[ring] dignity and respect on
the taxpayer.”92
By denying taxpayer status to one of the same-sex spouses and instead
labeling her a “dependent,” the federal tax laws impose a further and more
pernicious cost on LGBT families for their departure from the traditional
family norm. As Martha Fineman has noted, “[t]he very language of our
politics and politicians is mired in a simplistic rhetoric of individual
responsibility and an ideology of individual autonomy.”93 The federal tax laws
embody these views of individual responsibility and autonomy when they see
traditional families. Even where one spouse remains in the home engaged in
caretaking work, the federal tax laws see two taxpayers who are contributing
to society and taking responsibility for themselves and their family. But
when the federal tax laws see an LGBT family with a stay-at-home spouse,
See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 18–21 and
accompanying text.
91 See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 119 (“The common law expressed a
structure in which the distinct specialization of the spouses complemented
each other—the wage earner and the housewife; the protector and the
protected; the independent and the dependent. Each spouse needed his or her
complement in order to attain and maintain a whole, complete family entity,
an entity that provided for all its members’ needs. This specialization,
bringing together the head and heart of the family in the form of husband
and wife, allowed the marital family to function in a self-sufficient manner,
providing both economic and domestic resources to the unit.”); id. at 147
(“Our new legal and aspirational model for marriage is that of ‘partnership,’
an egalitarian concept that recognizes that both spouses make contributions,
even if they differ in kind. The contribution of the wife might still be
specialized and domestic, but the argument is that such a contribution, while
different in form than that made by the wage earner, is nonetheless of
presumptively equal value. Wives are not dependent and subservient.”).
92 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance:
Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 599, 638 (2007); see Nancy C.
Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV. 919,
983 (1997) (“society … accords more respect to taxpayers than nontaxpayers
in … public debates”).
93 FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 8–9.
90
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they do not see an individual taking responsibility for himself or herself but
rather an individual who is fully dependent upon another for their support.
Despite the fact that “dependency [is] inevitable[ and] reliance on
governmental largesse and subsidy is universal,” 94 applying the label
“dependent” to an individual is a clear mark of stigmatization in American
society:
Dependency is a particularly unappealing and stigmatized term
in American political and popular consciousness. The specter of
dependency is incompatible with our beliefs and myths. We
venerate the autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient
individual as our ideal. We assume that anyone can cultivate
these characteristics, consistent with our belief in the inherent
equality of all members of our society, and we stigmatize those
who do not.95
This attitude was on full—and, eventually, quite open—display during
the 2012 presidential campaign. In fact, Republican presidential candidate
Mitt Romney’s now infamous remarks at a private fundraiser illustrate how
being a taxpayer intersects with the widely accepted (albeit totally
unfounded) stigmatization of dependency:
During a private reception with wealthy donors…, Mitt
Romney described almost half of Americans as “people who pay
no income tax” and are “dependent upon government.” Those
voters, he said, would probably support President Obama
because they believe they are “victims” who are “entitled to
health care, to food, to housing, to you name it.”
In a brief and hastily called news conference…, Mr.
Romney acknowledged having made the blunt political and
cultural assessment, saying it was “not elegantly stated,” but he
stood by the substance of the remarks, insisting that he had
made similar observations in public without generating
controversy.
….

Id. at 33; see id. at 34–35 (“It is puzzling, as well as paradoxical, that the
term dependency should have such negative connotations. Far from being
pathological, avoidable, and the result of individual failings, a state of
dependency is a natural part of the human condition and is developmental in
nature.”).
95 Id. at 34; see id. at 8, 31.
94
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In one clip, Mr. Romney describes how his campaign
would not try to appeal to “47 percent of the people” who will
vote for Mr. Obama “no matter what.” They are, he says,
“dependent upon government, who believe that they are victims,
who believe the government has a responsibility to care for
them.”
He says those people “pay no income tax,” and “so our
message of low taxes doesn’t connect.” Mr. Romney adds: “My
job is not to worry about those people. I’ll never convince them
they should take personal responsibility and care for their
lives.”96
Mr. Romney’s running mate, U.S. Representative Paul Ryan, made similar
remarks well before his selection as a candidate for Vice President:
“We’re coming close to a tipping point in America where we
might have a net majority of takers versus makers in society,”
Romney’s running mate, Rep. Paul Ryan (Wis.), said at the
Heritage Foundation last year.
But the second part of that message is usually that the “takers”
don’t want it that way and instead want to rebuild an
independent life.
Ryan described social programs as necessary to “help people who
are down on their luck get back onto their feet,” though he
warned about the safety net turning into a “hammock that ends
up lulling people into lives of dependency.”97
In reporting on how Mr. Romney had bungled a conservative talking point in
the private remarks quoted above, reporters from the Washington Post
described the general attitude expressed by both Mr. Romney and Mr. Ryan
as being, “[f]or many conservatives, … as obvious as gravity: Government has
divided America into makers, who work hard and pay taxes, and takers, who
don’t do enough of either; there are too few of the former and too many of the
latter.”98
Like the more general stigmatization of dependency, this line between
those who pay taxes (i.e., the makers who contribute to society) and those
Michael D. Shear & Michael Barbaro, In Video Clip, Romney Calls 47%
“Dependent” and Feeling Entitled, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A1.
97 David A. Fahrenthold & Ed O’Keefe, In Video, Romney Strays from GOP
Points, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2012, at A6.
98 Id.
96
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who do not (i.e., the takers who are dependent on the work of the makers for
their support) is entirely unfounded. Indeed, Mr. Romney’s remarks came in
for sharp criticism among fact checkers after they were made public. The fact
checkers noted that, among those who did not pay income tax in 2011, 60%
paid payroll taxes (i.e., Social Security and Medicare taxes) and many of
those who paid neither income nor payroll taxes were elderly individuals who
had likely paid one or both of these taxes during their working years. 99
Additionally, many of those who pay no income tax are “makers” who are
working and contributing to society; however, they are just among the
working poor. 100 Others are actually quite wealthy but still manage to pay no
income tax at all.101 Furthermore,
those folks who aren’t paying federal taxes are almost all
paying state and local taxes—state sales taxes, real estate taxes
(either on their homes or built into their rents) and possibly
state income taxes too, since those taxes tend to exempt fewer
poor families than does the federal income tax. If they buy
gasoline, liquor or tobacco, or have telephones, they’re also
feeding the federal purse.102
The same lack of factual grounding is present in the stigmatization of
same-sex couples. One spouse is the “taxpayer” and the other is labeled a
“dependent.” But one is not a “maker” and the other a “taker.” Both are
productive members of society making contributions to their family in their
own ways—one by working in the paid labor force and the other by working
in the home. Yet, by applying these labels, a relationship of equality between
adults is turned into one of inequality. Relationships between a caretaker
and a dependent are not perceived as relationships of equals—in this case,

Janet Novack, Memo to Mitt Romney: The 47% Pay Taxes Too, FORBES
(Sept.
17,
2012,
9:16
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/09/17/memo-to-mitt-romneythe-47-pay-taxes-too/; see Annie Lowrey, Behind the “People Who Pay No
Income Tax,” ECONOMIX BLOG, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012, 10:23 PM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/the-reasons-behind-the-peoplewho-pay-no-income-tax/?hp (making similar points).
100 Dependency and Romney’s 47 Percenters, FACTCHECK.ORG (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://www.factcheck.org/2012/09/dependency-and-romneys-47-percenters/.
101 Id.
102 Novack, supra note 99; see Dependency and Romney’s 47 Percenters, supra
note 100 (making the same points); Lowrey, supra note 99 (same).
99
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referring to one spouse as a dependent effectively places him/her on the same
tax plane as the couple’s children.103
In contrast, when a different-sex couple divides their labor in the same
way, they are not stigmatized—one is not a taxpayer and the other a
dependent. Both are taxpayers. The federal government thus clearly puts its
imprimatur on the value of work in the home when it is performed by a
different-sex married spouse. Indeed, as we observed in Part II.A above,
through the tax laws, the federal government places a higher value on this
division of labor between different-sex spouses than it does on a division of
labor where each spouse works outside the home and equally contributes to
the family’s finances. The former couple is rewarded with a marriage bonus
for federal income tax purposes while the latter couple suffers a marriage
penalty.
Regardless of whether this sexual-orientation-based distinction is
tethered to reality, it is a form of stigmatization nonetheless.104 In fact, it is a
curious combination of, on one hand, the structural (and highly public) sexual
stigma represented by the federal and state defense of marriage acts
(collectively, DOMAs)105 and, on the other hand, something approaching, but
See FINEMAN, supra note 13, at 304 (describing how parent–child and
other relationships between a caretaker and an inevitable dependent are not
relationships of equals).
104 See Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Stigma and Sexual Prejudice in the United
States: A Conceptual Framework, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON
LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL IDENTITIES 65, 66 (Debra A. Hope ed., 2009)
(“[S]tigma is used here to refer to the negative regard and inferior status that
society collectively accords to people who possess a particular characteristic
or belong to a particular group or category. Inherent in this definition is the
fact that stigma constitutes shared knowledge about which attributes and
categories are valued by society, which ones are denigrated, and how these
valuations vary across situations.”).
105 See Gregory M. Herek, Anti-Equality Marriage Amendments and Sexual
Stigma, 67 J. SOC. ISSUES 413, 413–14 (2011) (“Because they deny lesbian,
gay, and bisexual members of same-sex couples the rights and recognition
enjoyed by heterosexuals, these statutes and amendments [i.e., the federal
and state DOMAs] are stigmatizing. Moreover, the campaigns waged to enact
them, during which sexual minority individuals’ basic rights are subjected to
public debate and a majority vote, have been (and continue to be) occasions
for the expression of sexual stigma.”); id. at 415 (explaining structural
stigma); id. at 415–18 (explaining why the federal and state DOMAs
constitute a form of structural stigma); see also Herek, supra note 104, at 67
(“Sexual stigma … is the stigma attached to any nonheterosexual behavior,
identity, relationship, or community. In other words, it is socially shared
103
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not fully resembling, the internalized (and more private) sexual self-stigma
that, “[i]n sexual minority individuals, … is manifested as negative feelings
toward their own same-sex attractions and toward others like themselves.”106
It is thus a mix of heterosexism and something akin to, but not quite the
same as, sexual self-stigma.107
Requiring same-sex couples to designate one spouse as a dependent of
the other in order to obtain tax benefits is an inextricable part of the
structural sexual stigma embodied in the federal and state DOMAs. Absent
the DOMAs, married same-sex couples would be entitled to file joint federal
income tax returns. If married same-sex couples were permitted to file joint
returns, then both spouses would be recognized as taxpayers, neither spouse
could be classified as a dependent of the other, and no sexual stigma would be
applied to the couple. Far from being stigmatized, under current law, the
couple would be actively favored over those married couples composed of two
spouses who work outside the home because the couple with a stay-at-home
spouse would be afforded a marriage bonus (instead of suffering a marriage
penalty).
At the same time, however, this tax dimension of structural sexual
stigma embodied in the DOMAs is both a part of and apart from the legal
architecture of heterosexism. Far from being so publicly visible, only the
Internal Revenue Service and the same-sex couple filing a return that
designates one spouse as a dependent of the other are actually aware of the
stigmatization. No one else is directly privy to the picture painted by a samesex couple’s tax return, because federal tax returns and tax return
information are confidential and the unauthorized disclosure of such
information is a federal crime.108 Some might go even further and argue that
this stigma is voluntarily imposed by the same-sex couple on itself; in other
words, they might argue that it is akin to “internalized stigma[, which is] an
individual’s personal acceptance of stigma as a part of her or his own value
system and self-concept.”109 After all, no legal compulsion forces one of the
same-sex spouses to claim the other as a dependent. The couple could always
forego the tax benefits to preserve (a modicum of) their dignity.110 Rather
knowledge
about
homosexuality’s
devalued
status
relative
to
heterosexuality.”); id. (explaining structural stigma).
106 Herek, supra note 105, at 415; Herek, supra note 104, at 73 (same).
107 Herek, supra note 105, at 415.
108 I.R.C. §§ 6103, 7213 (LEXIS through Jan. 15, 2013).
109 Herek, supra note 104, at 73.
110 Foregoing the tax benefits still would not eliminate or alter the
“[s]tructural sexual stigma … embedded in religion, language, the law, and
other social institutions.” Herek, supra note 105, at 415; see Herek, supra
note 104, at 67 (same).
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than voluntarily stigmatize themselves, the same-sex couple could
voluntarily pay the additional taxes that they would have saved by having
one claim the other as a dependent.
But this argument fails to capture the true nature of this
stigmatization. At one level, the idea that this is a chosen stigma misses the
mark. This choice is not a meaningful choice at all. Even with the tax benefits
associated with the stigma, Tables 1 through 3 demonstrate that same-sex
couples with a stay-at-home spouse already pay more tax than similarly
situated different-sex couples. For many LGBT families, when the choice is
between stigmatizing oneself or providing for one’s family, there really is no
choice involved at all. At another level, the idea that this is internalized
stigma also misses the mark. It may be true that some have accepted this
stigma “as a part of [their] value system and self-concept.”111 But, for many
others, the choice (if it can even be called a choice) to label one spouse a
dependent may have no relation at all to their value system or self-concept
and may merely be the necessary means of obtaining tax benefits that will
increase the available resources for supporting their families. So, even
though this may appear to be, at least in part, a form of self-stigma, it is
actually an overtly coerced stigmatization of the self (as opposed to the
usually more covert coercion associated with the stigma of the closet, for
example).112
That this highly visible, public stigmatization is privately enacted does
not in any way diminish the impact that it can have on the same-sex couple.
“A growing body of literature indicates that … experiences of stigma subject
sexual minority individuals to chronic stress beyond what other members of

Herek, supra note 104, at 73.
See David M. Frost & Ilan H. Meyer, Internalized Homophobia and
Relationship Quality Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals, 56 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 97, 97–98 (2009) (“It is important to note that despite
being internalized and insidious, the minority stress framework locates
internalized homophobia in its social origin, stemming from prevailing
heterosexism and sexual prejudice, not from internal pathology or a
personality trait.” (citation omitted)); id. at 107 (same); id. at 98–99
(discussing situations in which concealing one’s sexual orientation is a
protective mechanism in an unsafe environment—using the now-repealed
Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy in the military as an example—and, therefore,
not a form of internalized stigma); id. at 106 (discussing results of a study
that indicate that “[o]utness had a strong negative relationship with
internalized homophobia,” but that “they are not synonymous with one
another”).
111
112
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society normally experience, and this minority stress can have a significant
psychological impact.”113 As I have noted elsewhere,
researchers have detected … “minority” stress and its
concomitant negative mental health effects among lesbians, gay
men, and bisexuals. Ilan Meyer … has even “proposed a
minority stress model that explains the higher prevalence of
mental disorders [among lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals] as
caused by excess in social stressors related to stigma and
prejudice.”114
This stress stemming from the stigmatization of same-sex couples only
compounds the more generally increased levels of stress to which same-sex
couples are exposed (as compared to married different-sex couples) by reason
of being denied the benefits associated with marriage.115 Whatever its source,
“experiencing stress increases one’s risk for mental and physical illness.”116

Herek, supra note 105, at 418 (citation omitted).
Infanti, supra note 4, at 1237–38 (footnotes omitted) (citing Robin J. Lewis
et al., Stressors for Gay Men and Lesbians: Life Stress, Gay-Related Stress,
Stigma Consciousness, and Depressive Symptoms, 22 J. SOC. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 716, 717–18, 725–26 (2003); Ilan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and
Mental Health in Gay Men, 36 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 38, 45–52 (1995);
Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research Evidence, 129
PSYCHOL. BULL. 674, 679–82 (2003) [hereinafter Meyer, Prejudice]; Ilan H.
Meyer & Laura Dean, Internalized Homophobia, Intimacy, and Sexual
Behavior Among Gay and Bisexual Men, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION:
UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS 160,
178–83 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998)) (quoting Meyer, Prejudice, supra, at
691)).
115 David M. Frost, Similarities and Differences in the Pursuit of Intimacy
Among Sexual Minority and Heterosexual Individuals: A Personal Projects
Analysis, 67 J. SOC. ISSUES 282, 294 (2011) (“… LGB [i.e., lesbian, gay, and
bisexual] individuals perceived significantly more barriers to and devaluation
of their intimacy projects than heterosexuals, and this difference was more
pronounced at the macrosocial level (e.g., laws and policies).”); Gregory M.
Herek, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A
Social Science Perspective, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 607, 616 (2006) (“As a
consequence of these and the many other forms of differential treatment to
which they are subjected, same-sex couples are exposed to more stress than
married couples, especially when they encounter life’s inevitable difficulties
and challenges.”).
116 Herek, supra note 115, at 616; see Frost, supra note 115, at 295 (“As both
113
114

LGBT FAMILIES, TAX NOTHINGS

Page 33

The act of denying LGB [i.e., lesbian, gay, and bisexual]
individuals the right to civil marriage and their exclusion from
the accompanying benefits conferred on other (heterosexual)
citizens establishes same-sex couples as second class citizens
and may even diminish LGB individuals’ social and
psychological well-being. The result is an environment
characterized by minority stress.117
Moreover, the effects of this stress are not felt by the same-sex couple alone:
“To the extent that government recognition of same-sex relationships
facilitates well-being for parents, it will enhance the well-being of their
children because children benefit when their parents (regardless of the
latter’s sexual orientation) are financially secure, physically and
psychologically healthy, and not subjected to high levels of stress.”118
V.

Change on the Horizon?

LBGT families pay a hefty price for their departure from the
traditional family norm. Because of the DOMAs, LGBT families are treated
as tax nothings. These families are ignored for federal tax purposes unless
they can divide or realign themselves in ways that allow them to be seen for
federal tax purposes. As we observed in Part IV, LGBT families suffer both
monetarily and psychologically in this process of division and realignment of
their families merely to gain some (and by no means all) of the tax benefits
afforded to similarly situated traditional families.
As I write this essay, the U.S. Supreme Court has a case before it that
seems to hold the promise of removing the mark of this stigma (at least in
future cases; nothing can undo the effects wrought by past stigmatization). In
Windsor v. United States,119 the Supreme Court will squarely consider the
question whether section three of the federal DOMA, which concerns the
federal government’s refusal to legally recognize same-sex marriages, violates
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws embodied in the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. If the Supreme Court declares section
three of the federal DOMA unconstitutional, as it seems inclined to do,120 it
social stress and minority stress theory suggest, disadvantaged social status
(e.g., sexual minority status) is associated with increased stress exposure,
which is, in turn, associated with decreased health and well-being.” (citation
omitted)).
117 Frost, supra note 115, at 284.
118 Id. (citation omitted).
119 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 2012
U.S. LEXIS 9413 (Dec. 7, 2012).
120 Adam Liptak & Peter Baker, Justices Cast Doubt on U.S. Law Defining
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, at A1.

LGBT FAMILIES, TAX NOTHINGS

Page 34

might be said that all I will have done in this essay is to record for posterity
one of the (many) impacts on same-sex couples of this dark chapter in our
legal history.
At first blush, it might appear that, in the absence of section three of
DOMA, all married couples—whether different-sex or same-sex—would be
placed on the same legal footing for federal tax purposes. The reality,
however, is likely to be much more complicated because a Supreme Court
decision striking down section three of the federal DOMA will raise more
questions than it will answer. As I explain in a forthcoming essay, a favorable
decision in Windsor will have no effect on section two of the federal DOMA,
which permits states to refuse recognition to same-sex marriages celebrated
in other states.121 It would only be a very broad and favorable decision in
another Supreme Court case, Hollingsworth v. Perry, which concerns the
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, that could potentially alter the
recognition of same-sex marriage at the state level. 122 At this time, a
favorable decision in Hollingsworth is no foregone conclusion, and a farreaching one seems quite far-fetched. 123 Assuming that section three of
DOMA is found to be unconstitutional (and absent an unexpectedly farreaching decision in Hollingsworth), the federal tax laws will once again
revert to relying upon state law to determine whether a same-sex couple is
married for federal tax purposes.124
But which state’s law would the Internal Revenue Service turn to in
order to determine whether a same-sex couple is considered to be married for
federal tax purposes? Will the determination be made, as I am sure some will
argue, solely by reference to the law of the state of celebration?125 Or will the
determination be made by reference to the law of the state where the couple
resides? In the case of property ownership, financial transactions, and torts,
will we rely upon state choice of law rules to determine which state’s law

See generally Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of Tax Equality (Apr. 22,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
122 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9 th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012).
123 Adam Liptak, Justices Say Time May Be Wrong for Ruling on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, at A1.
124 I.R.C. § 7703; Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1385 (4th Cir. 1981) (“We
agree with the government’s argument that under the Internal Revenue Code
a federal court is bound by state law rather than federal law when
attempting to construe marital status.”).
125 Cf. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (recognizing common law marriages
validly entered into in one state even after the couple has moved to a state
that requires a ceremony as a prerequisite for a valid marriage).
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applies to marital status determinations? Or will some combination of rules
be cobbled together?
However simple and appealing a uniform federal rule might seem, it is
both unlikely and problematic. A uniform federal rule of recognizing samesex marriages based on the law of the state of celebration is unlikely because
it is at odds with the Obama administration’s current approach to same-sex
marriage.126 Last year, President Obama indicated that same-sex marriage is
an issue best left to be worked out at the state (as opposed to the federal)
level. 127 Notwithstanding signals of a different approach in President
Obama’s inaugural address in January 2013, the U.S. Solicitor General filed
a highly anticipated amicus curiae brief in Hollingsworth in late February
2013 that did not act upon these signals. 128 Despite arguing in favor of
heightened scrutiny for sexual-orientation-based classifications (a position
that the Obama administration announced in 2011),129 the Solicitor General’s
brief quite narrowly focused on the situation in California and other states
where same-sex couples are already afforded all of the benefits and
obligations of marriage but are deprived of the label “marriage” for their legal
relationship.130 The Solicitor General’s brief did not speak to the situation in
the majority of states, where same-sex couples’ relationships are not legally
recognized at all.
A uniform federal rule of recognizing same-sex marriages based on the
laws of the state of celebration is also problematic for at least two reasons.
First, it would perpetuate, in a different form, a problem that exists with the
current blanket refusal to recognize same-sex marriages at the federal level.
The proposed Respect for Marriage Act would achieve the same end by
determining marital status by reference to the law of the state of a marriage’s
celebration. H.R. 1116, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 598, 112th Cong. (2011). But
this legislation has little hope of enactment in the near future. See Tara
Siegel Bernard, Same-Sex Marriage Activists Look to Law, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2012, at B1.
127 Adam Liptak, A Predicament on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013,
at A13.
128 See id.; John Schwartz & Adam Liptak, U.S. Asks Justices to Reject Ban
on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at A1.
129 Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49404879/Attorney-General-Holder-s-Letter-toJohn-Boehner-on-DOMA-Appeal.
130 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at
9–12, Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/12144tsacUnitedStates.pdf.
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At present, same-sex couples whose relationships are legally recognized by
their home states are normally required to file two federal income tax returns
using single or head of household status, unless one same-sex spouse can
claim the other as a dependent.131 On their state income tax returns, however,
these couples usually cannot file using single or head of household status.132
Because state income tax laws often piggyback on the federal income tax, this
creates a nonconformity of filing status (e.g., single or head of household at
the federal level and married filing jointly or married filing separately at the
state level). This noncomformity leads to added complexity—and often added
compliance burdens—for same-sex couples. 133 For example, “this
nonconformity will produce higher tax preparation costs, higher state audit
risks (when states are confused by differences on the state and federal
returns), and more expense in dealing with state inquiries concerning
conforming changes after federal audit changes have been made.” 134 A
uniform federal rule would create a mirror image of this problem. With samesex marriages recognized regardless of the law of the couple’s state of
residence, same-sex couples would be required to file as married filing jointly
or married filing separately for federal purposes but would, in all likelihood,
be prohibited from using those statuses for purposes of most state tax laws.
This would give rise to precisely the same complexity and administrative
burden that currently exists; it would just be a different group of same-sex
couples that would be burdened (i.e., those who are already saddled with
state nonrecognition of their relationships).
Second, a uniform federal rule would do nothing to remove the stigma
that would persist for those who live in states such as Colorado, Idaho, and
South Carolina, which use federal taxable income as the starting point for
calculating state income tax liability.135 If same-sex couples are permitted to
file joint federal income tax returns but continue to be required to file using
Carlton Smith & Edward Stein, Dealing with DOMA: Federal Nonrecognition Complicates State Income Taxation of Same-Sex Relationships, 24
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 33 (2012). Colorado’s recently enacted civil union
regime is a notable exception to this general rule. Colorado Civil Union Act, §
1, 2013 Colo. SB 11 (LEXIS) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-117);
see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
132 Smith & Stein, supra note 135, at 49–50.
133 Id. at 49–81.
134 Id. at 34.
135 COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104 (2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 63-3011B, 3011C, -3024 (2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-1110 (2012). In fact, when
enacting its civil union regime, Colorado withheld from same-sex couples the
right to file joint state income tax returns precisely because they are
ineligible to file joint federal income tax returns. Colorado Civil Union Act, §
1, 2013 Colo. SB 11 (LEXIS) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-117).
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single or head of household status in these states, then, for purposes of
completing their state income tax returns, same-sex couples in these states
will be required to recompute their federal income taxes as if they were
unmarried, have one same-sex spouse claim the other as a dependent (just as
they do now), and use the federal taxable income so calculated as the starting
point for computing their state income taxes. For these same-sex couples, the
current stigmatization of “dependent” same-sex spouses would continue
relatively unabated.
In light of the foregoing discussion, a more likely result of the
invalidation of section three of DOMA will be for the Internal Revenue
Service to somehow cope with the extant patchwork of state laws when it
comes time to answer difficult questions regarding the marital status of
same-sex couples. Among the questions that the Internal Revenue Service
will have to consider are: Whose relationships will count? Will only same-sex
marriages be recognized? Will civil unions and domestic partnerships that
are intended to be the legal equivalent of marriage be recognized? 136 Will
relationships that entail a similar legal entanglement of the couple but entail
something less than all of the rights and obligations of marriage (e.g.,
designated beneficiary or reciprocal beneficiary relationships) be recognized?
(In other words, will the Internal Revenue Service further entrench the
extant privileging of marriage in the federal tax laws?137) When will those
state laws count? More specifically, which state’s law will govern the taxation
of transactions that touch multiple states, some of which legally recognize
same-sex relationships and others of which do not?
However the Internal Revenue Service decides to cope with this
patchwork of state laws in answering these questions, the only thing that is
clear is that one or more (potentially large) subsets of same-sex couples will
find that their relationships will continue to be denied legal recognition for
federal tax purposes. This will happen because a majority of states still
refuse legal recognition to same-sex relationships. 138 Consequently, what
seems like a possibly momentous advance in the fight for LGBT rights—one
that would ostensibly place LGBT families on equal legal footing with
traditional families for federal tax purposes—may actually leave many LGBT

See supra note 17.
For a fuller explanation and some more difficult questions that will need
to be answered, see Infanti, supra note 121.
138 Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (Dec. 10,
2012),
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/US_Marriage_Prohibitions.pdf.
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families standing in the same spot,139 tarnished with the same stigma that is
currently attached to their relationships by the federal tax laws.
VI.

Conclusion

This contribution to the Journal’s symposium Modern Families:
Changing Families and Challenging Laws has focused on what might be
viewed as the most “conventional” of LGBT families. 140 But, as we have
observed while peering through the window that the tax laws open upon our
collective American soul, even for these families—and perhaps especially for
them—“challenging” hardly begins to describe the tax law landscape that
they face. If we valued our families—all of our families—we would take the
necessary steps to make our tax laws relationship neutral in order to relieve
the tax burdens and stigmas that we currently impose on LGBT and other
nontraditional families.

139
140

Or possibly even a worse spot. See Infanti, supra note 121.
This is not a view that I share:
“Can family caregiving be a form of political resistance or
expression?” This provocative question begins a recent article by
law professor Laura Kessler. In answering “yes” to this question,
Kessler singles out lesbian and gay parenting as an example of
what she calls “transgressive caregiving” because the very
existence of lesbian and gay families represents a “radical
challenge to heterosexual reproduction and family relations.” At
the same time that it challenges heterosexist norms, lesbian and
gay parenting also calls into question a host of negative
stereotypes, particularly about gay men. Thus, in the hands of
lesbians and gay men, the simple (and, some critics might say,
assimilationist) act of parenting becomes a defiant, political act.

ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE
WHO CARE ABOUT THEM) 223–24 (2007) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Laura T.
Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2, 38 (2005)).

